Inquiry uncovers numerous deficiencies aboard USS Greeneville

PEARL HARBOR, Hawaii (AP) -- It was the gospel of Scott Waddle's command: safety, efficiency, backup. The skipper of the USS Greeneville had preached those words so often his crew recited them like schoolchildren practicing their ABCs.

On an overcast February morning, when the nuclear-powered attack submarine departed Pearl Harbor on a daylong cruise for a group of civilian guests, the crew and their skipper left their credo behind.

They were unsafe, allowing a trainee to operate a sonar post without a qualified crewman.

They were inefficient, running 43 minutes behind and skimping on preparations to surface and get back home.

They did not provide backup, failing to report key information about the location of another ship.

A Navy court of inquiry into the February 9 collision between the USS Greeneville and the Japanese trawler Ehime Maru uncovered a myriad of deficiencies aboard the submarine that day. One thing is clear: Had the crew and their commander practiced what they preached, the accident might never have happened.

Nine people, including four teen- learning how to fish, were killed when the submarine crashed into the trawler while demonstrating a rapid-surfacing drill for its guests.

"It's obvious some honest mistakes were made on this tragic day that led to the loss of life," Waddle, facing a possible court-martial, testified at the inquiry. He concluded: "The teamwork broke."

The inquiry ended Tuesday after 12 days and 33 witnesses. Over the coming weeks, the three presiding admirals will produce a report of their findings.

They also will recommend whether Waddle; his executive officer, Lt. Cmdr. Gerald Pfeifer; and his officer of the deck, Lt. j.g. Michael Coen, should face punishment. That decision ultimately rests with the chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

The officers could face anything from a reprimand or discharge to a military trial and prison time.

Waddle, the only one of the three to testify under oath, stands to lose the most. While accepting full responsibility for the collision, he sought to convince the court his actions do not warrant prosecution.

"Cmdr. Waddle exercised his judgment and he did his best on that day," the skipper's lawyer, Charles Gittins, told the court. "He may have fallen short, but it wasn't criminal."

On the day of the accident, "the stars and the moon and a few other things weren't going right," Rear Adm. Albert Konetzni, head of the Pacific Fleet's submarine force, testified.

When the Greeneville left Pearl Harbor at 7:59 a.m., it was an unusually ugly day. Skies were hazy and seas were choppy, with swells of 6 feet or more. Four hours later, when the Ehime Maru left Honolulu Harbor, the stark white ship faded into the clouds.

On the Greeneville, the crew was rusty. The sub had been in the shipyard six months getting outfitted with new equipment. It had finally set sail in January for a month of operations, returning to Pearl Harbor one week before the accident.

More training had been scheduled the weekend of February 9 but was canceled a few days earlier. The 16 civilian guests had been put on the Greeneville because it already was heading out to sea. When the sub's plans changed, under Navy rules, the ride-along should have been scrapped.

While standards were disregarded before the sub left, they were flagrantly ignored once the ship set sail.

For starters, nine of 13 key watch stations were manned by sailors not listed on the daily schedule. One post, a sonar station, was assigned to a trainee instead of a qualified operator.

Several crewmen testified it was standard practice in the Greeneville's sonar room to allow trainees to work without a qualified operator, even though it violates Navy procedures. The captain said he first learned of the practice at the inquiry, even though he had been skipper of the Greeneville two years.

A fire control technician, who analyzes sonar data and tracks surface vessels, admitted he also strayed from procedures when he stopped plotting sonar contacts on a scroll inside the control room. When challenged by the court's counsel, the crewman acknowledged he "got lazy."

Waddle admitted he violated Navy procedures by taking the submarine to classified depths to show his visitors what his ship could do. The court's presiding officer, Vice Adm. John Nathman, accused the commander of "giving them the E-ticket ride at Disneyland on a submarine."

For the court, the investigation boiled down to how Waddle ran his ship: Did he go too far in trying to impress his guests? Did he move too fast because he was showing off and, in doing so, sacrifice safety?

The cause of the accident centered on two factors -- why sonar operators and the fire control technician did not detect the Ehime Maru, and why Coen and Waddle never saw the boat through the periscope.

Testimony showed Waddle rushed preparations to surface the sub. A Navy investigator theorized it was because the ship was late getting back to port after lunch with the civilians ran long. Waddle, however, maintained he was not hurrying.

Nevertheless, the skipper ordered Coen to get to periscope depth in five minutes, though it usually takes 10 to ensure the submarine has accurate sonar data. He and Coen then spent 80 seconds, rather than the standard three minutes, looking through the periscope before proceeding on with the maneuver.

Sonar operators testified they believed they would have detected the Ehime Maru with only a couple more minutes to obtain data.

More important, the fire control technician had data six minutes before the collision showing the vessel was just 4,000 yards away. He testified he never saw that data because he was analyzing another sonar contact and did not have enough time to go back and finish his analysis of the first.

Why neither Coen nor Waddle saw the vessel through the periscope may never be clear. The boat may have been obscured by the haze, though the court noted Waddle could have taken a higher look.

That decision may haunt Waddle forever.

"In my mind I was confident ... there was nothing there," he said. "I don't know why I didn't see the Ehime Maru. I know that I didn't."

At the conclusion of the inquiry, Waddle's lawyer assured the court that "safety, efficiency and backup were not mere rhetoric" aboard the Greeneville.

Even the Navy's lead investigator, Rear Adm. Charles Griffiths Jr., conceded the Greeneville was a well-run ship that had a "bad day where some mistakes were made." "They happen to add up in a very worst-case way," Griffiths testified.

The admirals, too, seemed to grapple with the paradox of an accident like this happening on a sub like the Greeneville. Konetzni, the fleet's head submariner, offered his own explanation: "Human beings fail."

Copyright 2001 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.

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